Prejudice‐Based Rights in Criminal Procedure

Share on facebook
Share on twitter
Share on linkedin
Share on email
Share on print

This Article critically examines a cluster of rules that use the concept of prejudice to restrict the scope of criminal defendants’ procedural rights, forming what I call prejudice‐based rights. I focus, in particular, on outcome‐centric prejudice‐ based rights—rights that apply only when failing to apply them might cause prejudice by affecting the outcome of the case. Two of criminal defendants’ most important rights fit this description: the right, originating in Brady v. Maryland, to obtain favorable, “material” evidence within the government’s knowledge, and the right to effective assistance of counsel. Since prejudice (or equivalently, materiality) is an element of these rights, no constitutional violation occurs when the government suppresses favorable evidence, or defense counsel furnishes ineffective assistance, unless there is a reasonable probability that the outcome was affected thereby.

After fleshing out these concerns, I propose a two‐pronged strategy for reforming Brady, effective assistance of counsel, and potentially other outcome‐centric prejudice‐based rights. First, courts should remove prejudice from the definition of these rights, treating prejudice instead as a remedial question—one that would come into play when a convicted defendant seeks relief from an appellate or postconviction court, but generally not in other settings. Second, courts should dismantle the outcome‐centric conception of prejudice embedded in these doctrines and replace it with a non‐outcome‐centric framework that I call contextual harmless error review. These reforms would greatly improve the fairness of the criminal process, and would do so without unduly disturbing the finality of trial court judgments.

(Visited 48 times, 1 visits today)
Close